interest in Parmenidean reference new in the literature: Furth calls him a 'hyperdenotationist',[3] and the word is apt on almost any interpretation.

The unity of morning and evening stars (one thing under two descriptions) has become a familiar example in abstract philosophical discussion. Here, however, I shall be concerned with this unity as a concrete feature of Parmenides' sketch of mortal opinions. It is a commonplace that opposites (e.g. fire and night, B8.56–9) predominate in the opinions of mortals, but what we learn from the morning and evening stars is that these opposites can be judged to be one. And this is the same judgement made about contrary names in the section on truth, B8.38–41:

Wherefore it has been named all things that mortals have established, persuaded that they were true: 'to come to be' and 'to perish'; 'to be' and 'not at all'; 'change of place' and 'exchange of bright colour'.[4]

(Note how all of these are properties of the morning and evening stars as we see – or do not see – them.) But the real object behind all the contrary names is just Being. The names are not true of Being, but they point to Being; for Heraclitus, I suppose (B67 DK), they would all have been true. Thus the report on the morning and evening stars is an example – even within the opinion section – of Parmenides' view of the behaviour of two contrary terms in relation to the third thing they name. It would also follow from this that the contrary terms whose specification as fire and night begins the opinion section (B8.53–4) name Being, but inadequately, so that they merely point to Being without describing it fully or properly.

The moon, receiving light from the sun, is its contrary, but is also one with it because of the sharing of the sunlight. Thus this example, along with the morning and evening stars, shows how mortal thinking bifurcates unities into contraries.

One is accustomed to thinking of Parmenidean Being as beyond all opposites. These fragments fill in a corner of the story. The opposites have different meanings, but both inadequately point to Being even though these meanings exile them from the possession of full reality.[5]

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[3] See Montgomery Furth, 'Elements of Eleatic Ontology', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 7 (1968), 111–32, reprinted in A. P. D. Mourelatos, ed., *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City, 1974), pp. 241–70.

[4] These lines have been interpreted several ways (see David Gallop, *Parmenides of Elea: Fragments* [Toronto, 1984], pp. 70–1). Here I follow Woodbury and others in reading τῷ πάντ' ὀνόμασται, which draws a connection between mortal contraries and reality without relegating the former to the status of being mere names. I follow Gallop in adopting Burnyeat's translation in 38–9. The quoted translation of the sentence as a whole is from my *Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic* (New Haven, 1986), p. 165.

[5] I thank Texas A&M University for research support; A. P. D. Mourelatos for first drawing my attention to these fragments; and the Editors for some further valuable suggestions.

THE LAKONIAN KEY

'I can make nothing', declared Paul Cartledge in this journal some years ago, 'of the "Lakonian key" first attested in Aristophanes (*Thesm.* 423)'.[1] (For other attestations see Aristophon, *Peirithous*, fr. 7 Kassel–Austin; Menander, *Misoumenos*, fr. 8 Sandbach (10 Koerte); Plautus, *Mostellaria* 404–5, cf. 419–26.)

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[1] P. A. Cartledge, 'Spartan Wives: Liberation or Licence?', *CQ* 31 (1981), 84–105, at 102 n. 109.

To judge from the context of his remark, Cartledge's *aporia* stemmed from an expectation of finding something distinctively Spartan about the use of such a key for the control and/or confinement of women. That expectation is raised, to be sure, by the Aristophanes and (especially) Menander passages, and it emerges explicitly in the inference – that Spartan women were locked up – drawn from the latter by Olympiodoros on Plato, *Alkibiades I*, p. 152 Creuzer. Yet, as I. M. Barton observes in an article on the Lakonian key which Cartledge himself cited, 'of course, this tells us nothing about the original purpose for which such keys were devised'.[2] Furthermore, and positively, Barton's principal conclusion (ibid. 27), as Cartledge notes, is that 'the distinguishing feature of a Laconian key was that it locked a door from outside; and ... when a door was so locked it could not be opened from inside'.

This calls to mind one of the provisions, for a state of emergency amounting to martial law, which we find advocated in the mid-fourth-century B.C. treatise *How to Survive under Siege* by Aineias the Tactician (10.9–10):

Foreigners arriving must carry their weapons openly and ready to hand – and be disarmed without delay. Nobody, not even the innkeepers, should take them in without permission of the authorities, who should keep a register of them and, once they have found lodgings, their addresses. (10) The authorities should also lock up the inns, from the outside, every night. After a certain length of time the vagrants amongst these foreigners will have to be publicly expelled; but a register should be kept of men from neighbouring states whose visit is for educational reasons or some other useful purpose.[3]

Overtly, Aineias is not writing for, or about, Sparta; indeed he is at pains (from 1.1 onwards) to couch his many recommendations in non-specific terms. Nevertheless, 'werden häufig aktuelle Verhältnisse und Vorgänge ... aus der Peloponnes ... geschildert';[4] and there is much in Aineias' advice (10.8–10, 10.13–15) concerning the strict, not to say brutal, monitoring and winnowing-out of *xenoi* which is evocative of what was known or believed of Spartan policy and practice in the same area.[5] If it is reasonable to suppose that in Sparta, just as in the notional city envisaged by Aineias, *xenelasia* was the (possible) sharp end of a set of procedures which began with a form of nocturnal house-arrest, the Lakonian key – whatever its actual origins[6] – may thus have come by its name, and (schol. *Thesm.* 423) fame, from its disagreeable role in the control and confinement not of women but of aliens.

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    [2] I. M. Barton, 'Tranio's Laconian Key', *G & R* 19 (1972), 25–31, at 26.
    [3] ξένους τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους τὰ ὅπλα ἐμφανῆ καὶ πρόχειρα φέρειν, καὶ εὐθὺς αὐτῶν παραιρεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐτοὺς μηδένα ὑποδέχεσθαι, μηδὲ τοὺς πανδοκέας, ἄνευ τῶν ἀρχόντων, τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας ἀπογράφεσθαι καὶ παρ' ᾧ τίνες, ὅταν κατάγωνται. (10) τὰς δὲ νύκτας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων τὰ πανδοκεῖα ἔξωθεν κλείεσθαι. διὰ χρόνου δέ τινος, ὅσοι ἂν ταλαπείριοι αὐτῶν ὦσιν, ἐκκηρύττεσθαι· ὁμόρους δὲ ἢ κατὰ παίδευσιν ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ χρείαν ἐπιδημοῦντας ἀπογράφεσθαι.
    [4] G. A. Lehmann, 'Krise und innere Bedrohung der hellenischen Polis bei Aeneas Tacticus', in *Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte: Festschrift Friedrich Vittinghoff* (Cologne, 1980), pp. 71–86, at 71.
    [5] See, e.g., H. Schaefer, 'Xenelasia', *RE* ix.A.2 (1967), 1436–8; D. Whitehead, *AncSoc* 13/14 (1982/83), 105–30, at 129.
    [6] See H. Diels, *Parmenides* (Berlin, 1897), pp. 141–5, cf. *Antike Technik*[3] (Leipzig and Berlin, 1924), pp. 52–5.